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This paper analyzes e⁄ects of stronger patent rights on R&D and innovation. It presents a
model where the scope of a patent a⁄ects an entrant ￿rm￿ s technology choice and thereby the
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11 Introduction
It is well established that innovation is an important factor for economic growth. The incentives
for innovation are determined by the system of intellectual property rights, which hereby plays
a crucial role in the growth process. It is widely perceived that patent protection in the US has
increased over the last two decades; see, for example, Ja⁄e (2000) and Gallini (2002). They point
at two factors that suggest this to be the case. First, patent holders have been awarded greater
power in infringement lawsuits by a broadening of the interpretation of patent claims. Second,
patent protection has been extended to cover new areas, notably software, business methods and
biotechnology, where a large number of patents with broad scope have been granted. According
to Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), a similar development has taken place in Europe. A
broad patent scope implies a greater protection for the patent holder as more products will
infringe on the patent and consequently require a license from the patent holder in order to be
sold on the market. As is well established, such a strengthening of patent rights has an impact
on incentives for innovation and research e⁄orts. However, this paper argues that an increase in
patent scope can a⁄ect not only investments in R&D, but also the allocation of R&D investment
across technologies, and thereby the amount of wasteful duplication of R&D that takes place.
There are several research strategies that ￿rms can pursue in order to ￿nd the next generation
of a product in a given market. They can choose to build on the state-of-the-art technology in
that market and invest in R&D to make improvements on it, or they can choose to direct their
R&D to alternative technologies that are new to the market. If the state-of-the-art technology
is covered by a patent that is broad in scope, new products building on the patented technology
will be infringing on the patent. Consequently, entrant ￿rms face two options: to conduct R&D
on an alternative technology and avoid the risk of patent infringement, or conduct R&D using
the patented technology and purchase a license from the patent holder. Purchasing a license can
be very costly, or even impossible if the patent holder refuses to license to a competitor. In such
a situation, the broad patent scope induces an entrant ￿rm to direct its R&D to an alternative
technology. Empirical studies show that patents in many instances do a⁄ect ￿rms￿choices of R&D
projects. Lerner (1995) ￿nds that ￿rms with high litigation costs avoid research areas that are
occupied by other ￿rms, particularly when these ￿rms have low litigation costs. Walsh, Arora and
Cohen (2003) analyze the e⁄ect of patents on R&D in the pharmaceutical industry and ￿nd cases
where ￿rms direct R&D investment to research areas less covered by patents. A recent example
2comes from the auto industry; in November 2009, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation
(SAIC) announced that it had developed a plug-in hybrid electromechanical coupling technology,
which could help it ￿avoiding technical barriers from Toyota and GM￿ s hybrid products￿ .1
If entrant ￿rms choose to do R&D on alternative technologies to avoid infringing on a patent,
that has an e⁄ect on their investments. Due to higher costs or higher uncertainty, alternative
technologies are likely to be ex ante less promising than the state-of-the-art technology. Hence,
a broad patent scope could decrease entrant ￿rms￿incentives to invest in R&D for subsequent
innovation. However, a broad patent scope implies that research e⁄orts for subsequent innovation
may be better allocated across di⁄erent technologies. If many ￿rms conduct R&D to develop the
same technology, there is wasteful duplication of research investment. Firms may, for example,
build parallel labs and carry out identical experiments or build identical prototypes, which is
a waste of R&D resources from a welfare point of view. If they conduct R&D using di⁄erent
technologies, there is less wasteful duplication. Direct evidence of duplication of R&D is given
by simultaneous innovation which is common in science, as discussed by Chatterjee and Evans
(2004). An example in Murray (2008) is the invention of transgenic mice in 1980, which was
reported by ￿ve independent research teams. Duplication of R&D which does not result in
inventions is certainly more common.
I present a model which can analyze this trade-o⁄ between investments in R&D and wasteful
duplication of R&D that patent scope creates. The model features an incumbent ￿rm, which
holds a patent, and an entrant. Both invest in R&D in order to ￿nd a new generation of a
product. There are two possible strategies available to the entrant; to build on the patented
state-of-the-art technology or to use an alternative technology. If the entrant invests in the
state-of-of-the-art technology, there is wasteful duplication of R&D investment, whereas if the
entrant chooses the alternative technology the allocation of total R&D investment is improved.
The model shows that if the incumbent ￿rm￿ s pro￿t increase from innovation is large, and
the patented technology has a small advantage relative to the alternative technology, a broad
patent scope gives more innovation than a narrow patent scope. Hence, the negative e⁄ects
of duplication are in some instances su¢ ciently large to warrant a broad patent scope. The
intuition for the result is that if the patented technology has a small advantage, the entrant will
not reduce his investment to any considerable extent if he is induced to conduct R&D on an
1Global Times, November 3, 2009.
3alternative technology. In addition, if the incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase from innovation is high,
his investment is large and the amount of wasteful duplication under a narrow scope is high.
Consequently, a broad patent scope gives more innovation.
However, as the entrant￿ s bargaining power in license agreements increases, a broad scope
becomes less conducive to innovation. The explanation is that the entrant to a greater extent
chooses licensing, in which case a broad patent scope does not reduce duplication because the
entrant still does R&D on the state-of-the-art technology. I also ￿nd that if the model is extended
to Stackelberg competition the advantage of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears, as
strategic overinvestment by the incumbent can eliminate any wasteful duplication. Consequently,
the desirability of a broad patent scope relies heavily on low bargaining power for the entrant
and simultaneous investment by ￿rms.
There is a large theoretical literature on the economic e⁄ects of intellectual property rights.
Several contributions concern the trade-o⁄ between patent scope and patent length, for example
Klemperer (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Gallini (1992). These models focus on a single
invention whereas, in practise, inventions are sequential. Green and Scotchmer (1995) construct a
model with sequential innovation and ￿nd that a broad patent scope can be necessary to give the
￿rst innovator su¢ cient incentives to invest. Following Green and Scotchmer (1995), a number of
papers have analyzed how patent scope a⁄ect the division of pro￿ts between the ￿rst and second
innovator; Chang (1995), Matutes el al. (1996), Denicolo (2000), Erkal (2005) and Chou and
Haller (2007) among others. O￿ Donoghue et al. (1998) also study patent scope in the context of
sequential innovation, but focus on the trade-o⁄ between innovation and monopoly distortions.
In similarity with O￿ Donoghue et al. (1998), Denicolo (2000), and Erkal (2005), this paper
compares two distinct patent regimes; a broad and a narrow scope. It also features two ￿rms,
as in Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Chou and Haller (2007), but considers the incentives for
subsequent innovation where the ￿rst ￿rm competes with the second and inventions are intended
for the same market, which implies business stealing. In the law and economics literature, Kitch
(1977) argues that pioneering technologies should be granted patents with broad scope, as it will
allow the innovator to coordinate further development of the technology and thereby, wasteful
duplication of e⁄ort is reduced. His view is challenged by Merges and Nelson (1990) who argue
that competition will give the patent holder higher incentives to develop his technology. Domeij
(2000) discusses the e⁄ects of patent scope on duplication of investments in the context of the
4pharmaceutical industry. Common for these authors is that they do not formalize their arguments
in a model. Formal models on duplication of e⁄ort in research and development include Tandon
(1983), Jones and Williams (2000), Zeira (2003), Chatterjee and Evans (2004) and Cabral and
Polak (2004).
The contribution of this paper is that it considers the impact of a particular feature of the
patent system, namely patent scope, on duplication of R&D investment as well as on incentives
to invest in R&D. The e⁄ect of patent scope on ￿rms￿choices of R&D projects has been shown
empirically, and therefore is important to take into consideration when evaluating the impact
of patent scope on innovation. Firms￿choices of R&D projects and the technologies they build
on in turn a⁄ects the amount of wasteful R&D duplication that takes place in the economy.
Incorporating the e⁄ect of patent scope on technology choice and on wasteful duplication in the
analysis delivers new insights. It shows that the bene￿ts of a broad patent scope depend on
market and technology characteristics, such as the availability of alternative technologies, the
incumbent￿ s ability to commit to R&D investment, as well as ￿rms￿bargaining powers in license
agreements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the determination of patent scope in
practise. Section 3 characterizes the model and Section 4 entails the investments and the prob-
abilities of innovation resulting from the narrow and broad patent scope, respectively. Section 5
extends the model to allow for Stackelberg competition. Section 6 concludes.
2 Determination of patent scope
The scope of a patent is central to this analysis. Therefore, I will start with a brief introduction to
the determination of patent scope in patent law and practice, as described in Merges and Nelson
(1990). A patent application consists of a speci￿cation of the invention and a set of claims. The
speci￿cation describes the problem the innovator faced, and how it was solved. The claims de￿ne
what the inventor considers to be the scope of the invention, the ￿technological territory￿where
he can sue other parties for infringement. The general rule is that a patent￿ s claims should extend
beyond the precise disclosure of the invention in the speci￿cation. Otherwise, imitators could
make minor changes to that example without infringing and the patent would be of little value.
The inventor naturally wants to make the claims as broad as possible, and the patent examiner
5must decide what scope is appropriate, which claims should be admitted and which should not.
In infringement cases, the court examines whether there is ￿literal infringement￿ , namely the
product literally falls within the boundaries of the patent claims. If not, the court also examines
whether the product does the work in substantially the same way and accomplishes substantially
the same result as the patented product, in which case it is also infringing. Consequently,
patent scope is determined in two instances, by two separate authorities. Ex ante, if the patent
holder has not sued any other party for infringement, the patent scope is de￿ned by the claims as
determined by the Patent O¢ ce. Ex post, in an infringement case, the patent scope is determined
by the court, in its decision on whether the patent has been infringed.
3 The model
The economy has two ￿rms, an incumbent and an entrant. Both ￿rms make investments in R&D
to ￿nd a new invention, which has the private value V when patented. The incumbent holds a
patent connected to the current state-of-the-art technology and earns a pro￿t from producing
the corresponding product. The pro￿t is expressed as a share of the value of the next invention,
￿V , where ￿ 2 [0;1]. The entrant earns no pro￿ts. Innovation is drastic; new inventions replace
previous ones.
There are two possible research strategies for a ￿rm to pursue. Strategy C is to build on the
current state-of-the-art technology, technology C, and make an improved product. Strategy A is
to use an alternative technology, technology A, for which there is no risk of patent infringement.
In this context, an alternative technology should be more broadly interpreted as using another
process, material, algorithm, chemical compound etc., depending on the industry and the nature
of the product. I assume that each ￿rm can pursue only one research strategy at a given point
in time. A justi￿cation for this assumption is that using a technology requires a ￿xed cost or an
investment in human capital. Irrespective of which technology is used, the private value of an
invention is V .2
Each technology has an exogenous probability ￿k, k 2 fC;Ag, of leading to a new invention.
The alternative technology has a weakly lower probability of leading to a new invention than the
2There is no strong reason to believe that using di⁄erent technologies will generate inventions of exactly
the same value. However, it makes it possible to distinguish the e⁄ects of patent regime on aggregate
innovation from e⁄ects of a di⁄ering value of the invention.
6state-of-the-art: ￿A ￿ ￿C. The di⁄erence between ￿C and ￿A re￿ ects the relative advantage of
the state-of-the-art technology. I assume that either technology C or A leads to a new invention,
but not both. This is a simpli￿cation of technology development, but it is made for tractability.
I will discuss the implications of the assumption further below. In addition, I normalize the sum
of ￿A and ￿C to 1, as this reduces the number of model parameters. Hence, ￿A = 1 ￿ ￿C.
I postulate that the incumbent always invests in technology C, irrespective of the entrant￿ s
technology choice. The motivation is that the incumbent has already incurred the cost of investing
in that technology and acquired the necessary human capital.
The possibility of duplication of R&D can be illustrated in terms of two urns, A and C, ￿lled
with marbles. Suppose that a ￿rm￿ s investment in R&D can be described as drawing a number
of marbles from one of the urns, where each marble is equivalent to conducting one experiment.
Each urn has its own set of marbles and the number of marbles is nk, k 2 fC;Ag. Only one
marble corresponds to a successful experiment, i.e. an invention, and this marble is denoted 1.
With probability ￿C, marble number 1 is in urn C. Firm j purchases tj, j 2 fI;Eg marbles from
urn k and the probability that it innovates, conditional on having chosen the right urn, is
tj
nk.
The draws of di⁄erent ￿rms are independent events. Suppose ￿rst that both ￿rms choose urn C.
The incumbent draws tI marbles and replaces them, which gives him a conditional innovation
probability equal to tI
nC: The entrant draws tE marbles, which results in a conditional innovation
probability of tE
nC. It is possible that both ￿rms draw marble no 1. This is a duplication of R&D
resources from the point of view of society.3 A social planner is interested in the probability of
any of the ￿rms drawing marble no 1. For two events, A and B, the probability of at least one
event occurring is: P(A [ B) = P(A) + P(B) ￿ P(A \ B): In our example, the probability of at
least one invention is:

















nC represents a waste of resources due to duplication.
Now, suppose that the incumbent draws marbles from urn C and the entrant draws marbles
from urn A. They have probabilities tI
nC and tE
nA, respectively, of drawing marble number 1,
conditional on choosing the right urn. The probability that both ￿rms draw the same marble is
3No ￿rm draws the same marble twice; there is no duplication at the ￿rm level.
7zero. Hence, the probability of at least one invention is:
P(no 1 at least once) = ￿C
tI
nC




There is no waste of resources due to duplication.
Next, I turn to the characterization of equilibrium investments in R&D. In this paper, the
R&D process is modeled as a one-shot game. This modeling choice is motivated by the fact that
￿rms￿R&D projects for development of new products are often close to irreversible, especially in
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. As a consequence, there is a positive probability
that both ￿rms innovate if they choose the same technology. In this case, each ￿rm has probability
1
2 of obtaining the patent.4 In the baseline model, ￿rms invest in R&D simultaneously. In Section
5, the model is extended to Stackelberg competition.
In the model, the equilibrium investments are de￿ned as follows. The incumbent invests the
amount of resources, pI, which maximizes his expected payo⁄ ￿I, where I denotes incumbent.
The entrant chooses both which technology to invest in, denoted k, and the level of investment,
pE; which maximizes his expected payo⁄ ￿E, where E denotes entrant. Each ￿rm￿ s investment
is its probability of innovating, conditional on having chosen the technology that leads to a new
invention. The timing of the game is as follows: First, the entrant chooses which technology to
invest in. Second, given the entrant￿ s technology choice, both ￿rms simultaneously decide how
much to invest.
An equilibrium is a triplet fk￿;p￿
I;p￿




E(k￿) = argmaxpE ￿E(k￿;p￿
I(k￿);pE) and
p￿
I(k￿) = argmaxpI ￿I(k￿;pI;p￿
E(k￿)). I divide the equilibria into two types, given the en-
trant￿ s choice of technology: If the entrant chooses C, the equilibrium is denoted C and if the
entrant chooses A, the equilibrium is denoted A: In order to interpret the ￿rms￿investments as
conditional innovation probabilities, they must be bounded above by 1. I focus on the case where
the optimal investment levels are interior solutions. In the baseline model, this is achieved by
setting V = 1. The e⁄ects of varying V will be analyzed in Section 4.5.
4Suppose that the game lasts for a period of ￿ve years. If inventions arrive with a hazard rate that is
constant over the period, conditional on both ￿rms having innovated at the end of the period, the ￿rms
have the same probability of innovating at each point in time.
84 Patent scope
In this model, the scope of a patent can either be narrow or broad. If the scope of the patent on
technology C is narrow, the entrant can choose technology C without any risk of infringement.
If the patent scope is broad, the entrant is required to acquire a license from the incumbent if
he chooses technology C and innovates. The entrant￿ s invention is always infringing, hence, the
scope covers all improvements of technology C.5 Indeed, this can often be the case; an example
is the patent on one-click buying, granted to Amazon.com. The patent covers all techniques of
allowing customers to make online purchases with one single click. Another example, from the
biotech industry, is the patent connected to the gene BRCA1, associated with breast cancer. The
patent covers all diagnostic tests identifying mutations in BRCA1.
In the model, patent scope does not a⁄ect ￿; the incumbent￿ s pro￿t relative to the value of
the invention, V .6 Neither does it a⁄ect V directly. This model abstracts from the potential
e⁄ects of patent scope on innovation through current pro￿t and the value of an invention, and
focuses on the e⁄ect through technology choice alone. Nevertheless, as a robustness check I also
allow V to take a higher, exogenously given value under a broad relative to a narrow scope. The
result is reported in Section 4.5.
4.1 Narrow patent scope
I start with a characterization of the investments and innovation probabilities under a narrow
scope in equilibria C and A, respectively.
In equilibrium C, the entrant invests in technology C. Since the patent scope is narrow, there
is no risk of patent infringement and the entrant can build on technology C without acquiring a
license.
5This assumption is also made in O￿ Donoghue et al. (1998), Denicolo (2000), and Erkal (2005).
6A broad scope may increase the pro￿ts accruing to the patent holder if it discourages substitutes
during the patented product￿ s life. This would reduce the incumbent￿ s investment in R&D under a broad
scope relative to a narrow. The assumption that ￿ is independent of scope gives an upper bound for the
incumbent￿ s investment under a broad scope, and an upper bound for the e⁄ects of patent scope.
9The expected payo⁄ to the incumbent in equilibrium C is





V (1 ￿ ￿) +
1
2







With probability ￿CpI(1￿pE), the incumbent innovates whereas the entrant does not. The gain
is V (1 ￿ ￿), the value of the invention net of current pro￿t, as the new product replaces the old
one. I refer to V (1 ￿ ￿) as the incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase from innovation, i.e. the di⁄erence
in pro￿t after versus before he innovates. With probability ￿CpE(1 ￿ pI) the entrant innovates
but not the incumbent, and the latter loses his current pro￿ts. With probability ￿CpEpI both
￿rms innovate and the incumbent has probability 1




2 . The ￿rst-order condition yields
pI = ￿CV
￿







The incumbent￿ s investment is increasing in ￿C and V . It is increasing in pE if ￿ > 1
2. 7
The expected payo⁄ to the entrant in equilibrium C is








With probability ￿CpE(1 ￿ pI), the entrant innovates and gets V . With probability ￿CpEpI
both ￿rms innovate and the entrant gets V with probability 1
2. As described above, there is no
need for the entrant to acquire a license to technology C and hence it pays no license fees. The
variable cost of R&D is
p2
E








The entrant￿ s investment is increasing in ￿C and V : It is decreasing in pI; competition from the
7An increase in pE reduces the probability that the incumbent wins; he innovates but the entrant does
not. This decreases his incentives to invest. It also increases the incumbent￿ s returns to investing in order
not to lose current pro￿t, which increases his incentive to invest. If ￿ > 1
2, the expected payo⁄ from
winning is low. The latter e⁄ect dominates. If ￿ < 1
2, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates. The cuto⁄ is at ￿ = 1
2,
given the assumption that if both ￿rms innovate each has probability 1
2 of obtaining the patent.
10incumbent induces the entrant to invest less.
Solving for Nash equilibrium investment levels, given V = 1, yields the following investment
by the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, where superscript C indicates equilibrium C,
pC
I (￿;￿C) =












The incumbent￿ s investment pC
I (￿;￿C) is increasing in ￿C and decreasing in ￿. The entrant￿ s
investment pC
E(￿;￿C) is increasing in ￿C and ￿. An increase in ￿C implies a higher probability
that technology C leads to a new invention, which increases both ￿rms￿investments. An increase
in ￿ decreases the incumbent￿ s pro￿t from innovating, V (1 ￿ ￿), which reduces his investment.
The entrant responds to this reduction by increasing his investment.
Next, I turn to equilibrium A, where the entrant invests in technology A. The expected
payo⁄ to the incumbent is





Now, the incumbent￿ s optimal investment is independent of the entrant￿ s investment. Taking
the ￿rst-order condition, given V = 1, yields
pA
I (￿;￿C) = ￿C (1 ￿ ￿)
where superscript A indicates equilibrium A. The expected payo⁄ to the entrant in equilibrium
A is





With probability (1￿￿C)pE, the entrant innovates and gets V , where (1￿￿C) is the probability
that technology A leads to a new invention. As can be seen from this expression, the entrant￿ s
optimal investment is independent of the incumbent￿ s investment. Given V = 1, the ￿rst-order
condition reads:
pA
E(￿C) = 1 ￿ ￿C:
11Now, I return to the assumption that both technologies cannot simultaneously lead to a
new invention. Relaxing that assumption would have the following implications. There would
be strategic interaction between the two ￿rms in equilibrium A, which reduces the entrant￿ s
investment, and increases that of the incumbent, if ￿ is su¢ ciently high. If both ￿rms innovate,
each obtain a patent and if they collude, each of them gets pro￿t V
2 . The ￿rms still carry out
di⁄erent experiments, and there is no e⁄ect on duplication. Consequently, this assumption does
not a⁄ect the main mechanisms of the model.
The next step is to determine which technology the entrant will invest in. The entrant
chooses the technology which gives the highest expected payo⁄, given the equilibrium investments
described above. The condition for when choosing C has a higher payo⁄ to the entrant than
choosing A is given below.
Proposition 1 If ￿ > ￿E, the Nash equilibrium is C, where
￿E =






Proof. See the Appendix.
The higher is ￿, the lower is the incumbent￿ s investment, which increases the entrant￿ s expected
payo⁄ from choosing C relative to A. The threshold ￿E, where subscript E denotes entrant,
is decreasing in ￿C, as a larger probability of success for technology C increases the entrant￿ s
relative expected payo⁄ from choosing C. Given the two ￿rms￿optimal investments and the
entrant￿ s choice of technology, we can determine the aggregate innovation probability under a
narrow scope. The aggregate innovation probability is de￿ned as the probability of at least one











I (￿;￿C) + pC




if ￿ ￿ ￿E
if ￿ > ￿E
(6)
where superscript N denotes narrow patent scope. Suppose ￿rst that ￿ ￿ ￿E so that the
equilibrium is A. Since the two ￿rms invest in di⁄erent technologies, there is no wasteful dupli-
cation but the entrant invests in a technology with a disadvantage relative to the state-of-the-art
technology; ￿C > (1￿￿C). Suppose now instead that ￿ > ￿E so that the equilibrium is C. When
both the entrant and the incumbent invest in the same technology, there is wasteful duplication
of R&D investment and the last term gives the amount of wasteful duplication that occurs.
124.2 Broad patent scope
Now, I turn to a characterization of investments and technology choice under a broad patent
scope. In this case, the entrant￿ s invention will be infringing if it builds on technology C. The
entrant therefore chooses between either conducting R&D on technology A or conducting R&D
on technology C and acquiring a license from the incumbent.
If the entrant chooses to license, the license fee is speci￿ed as follows. The license agreement
stipulates a ￿xed license fee, F, and I assume that the agreement is written ex post, after the
entrant has innovated. The fee is determined by Nash bargaining. The share of the surplus from
the license agreement that goes to each ￿rm depends on its outside option and its bargaining
power. The incumbent￿ s outside option is to continue selling his patented product, with pro￿t
￿V . The entrant￿ s outside option is to conduct R&D on technology A. If the incumbent has all
the bargaining power, he will demand a maximal fee such that the entrant receives his outside
option, or slightly lower. In anticipation of this fee, the entrant never chooses technology C.
Hence, if the incumbent has all bargaining power, no licensing will take place. This naturally
gives a lower bound of the e⁄ects of licensing.
If, on the other hand, the entrant has all bargaining power, this results in the lowest possible
license fee, F = ￿V , and a maximal e⁄ect of license agreements on investments. This gives
an upper bound on the e⁄ects of licensing. If the bargaining powers lie in between these two
extremes, the e⁄ect of licensing on investments and innovation falls between the lower and the
upper bound. First, I describe the equilibrium investments and innovation probabilities for
the lower bound, when the incumbent has all bargaining power and the entrant never chooses
licensing, and then I turn to the upper bound, when the entrant has all bargaining power and
may choose to license the patent from the incumbent.
Suppose ￿rst that the incumbent has all bargaining power in licensing negotiations, and
demands an license fee so high that the entrant chooses not to license, but instead to do R&D on
technology A. The ￿rms are in equilibrium A, and given their optimal investments, the aggregate
innovation probability is equal to
iB = ￿CpA
I (￿;￿C) + (1 ￿ ￿C)pA
E (￿C) (7)
where superscript B denotes broad patent scope. The expression can be compared to the innova-
tion probability under a narrow patent scope under the condition if ￿ ￿ ￿E, as given by (6). If
13the entrant chooses technology A, there is no di⁄erence between the patent regimes. Under both
a broad and narrow scope ￿rms choose di⁄erent technologies and there is no wasteful duplication,
but the entrant chooses a technology that is less promising than the state-of-the-art.
Next, I turn to the case when the entrant has all bargaining power in licensing negotiations,
which gives the minimum license fee, F = ￿V . Now, the entrant either chooses technology C
and pays the license fee F = ￿V or chooses technology A. I start with describing the optimal
payo⁄s in the former case.
The expected payo⁄ to the incumbent when the entrant chooses technology C and acquires
a license is















where subscript L denotes licensing. The di⁄erence between (8) and (1) is that if the entrant
innovates and the incumbent does not, the incumbent gets a license fee equal to ￿V and he loses
current pro￿t ￿V . The net gain is zero. In case both innovate and the entrant gets the patent,
the net gain is again zero.
The expected payo⁄ to the entrant when he chooses technology C and obtains a license is
￿E;L(C;pI;pE) = ￿CpE(1 ￿ pI)V (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿CpEpI







The di⁄erence between (9) and (2) is that the entrant￿ s net gain is V (1 ￿ ￿). Solving for the
Nash equilibrium, given V = 1, yields:
pI;L (￿;￿C) = pE;L (￿;￿C) =
2￿C(1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿C(1 ￿ ￿)
:
The optimal investments for the two ￿rms are identical. The explanation is that the entrant
indirectly takes into account the incumbent￿ s pro￿t loss through the license fee. In addition, the
incumbent￿ s expected payo⁄ from not innovating if the entrant innovates is zero, as the license
revenue compensates for the loss of current pro￿t. One can compare the investments above to
the equilibrium investments in equilibrium C under a narrow scope. Then, I ￿nd that for all
14￿ > 0,
pI;L (￿;￿C) < pC
I (￿;￿C); (10)
pE;L (￿;￿C) < pC
E (￿;￿C): (11)
The entrant invests less in R&D on technology C if he must acquire a license than if not, because
the net pro￿t is lower. The incumbent invests less in R&D on technology C if he can license his
patented technology than if not, because he has less to lose from not innovating.
Under a broad patent scope, the entrant chooses between conducting R&D on technology C,
which has a higher probability of success but where the pro￿t net of the license fee is V (1 ￿ ￿);
and conducting R&D on technology A, which has a lower probability of success but yields a
pro￿t V since there is no need to acquire a license. The following condition determines when the
entrant chooses C over A:
Proposition 2 Let the license fee be ￿V . The entrant chooses technology C even under a broad
patent scope if ￿ ￿ ￿L, where
￿L =





Proof. See the Appendix.
The entrant chooses technology C for a su¢ ciently low ￿, that is when the license fee is su¢ ciently
low. If the license fee is high, a broad patent scope induces the entrant to conduct research on
alternative technologies to avoid patent infringement. As described in the introduction, a real
world example of such a case is the development of a new plug-in hybrid electromechanical
coupling technology by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). The threshold ￿L,
where L denotes licensing, is increasing in ￿C. A higher advantage for technology C relative to
A increases the payo⁄ to the entrant from choosing C.






￿C (pI;L (￿;￿C) + pE;L (￿;￿C) ￿ pI;L (￿;￿C)pE;L (￿;￿C))
￿CpA
I (￿;￿C) + (1 ￿ ￿C)pA
E (￿C)
if ￿ ￿ ￿L
if ￿ > ￿L
(12)
Suppose that ￿ ￿ ￿L. The entrant chooses to do R&D on technology C and acquire a license.
15In this case, there is wasteful duplication of R&D as captured by the last term. If instead, ￿ > ￿L,
the entrant chooses technology A and there is no wasteful duplication. In similarity to when the
entrant has no bargaining power, in this case there is no di⁄erence between the patent regimes.
4.3 Does a broad scope give a higher probability of innovation?
To assess the e⁄ects of an increase in patent scope on innovation, it is instructive to return to
the trade-o⁄ between investment in R&D and the allocation of investment. A narrow patent
scope allows both ￿rms to do research on the most promising technology, but gives rise to
wasteful duplication of R&D. A broad patent scope forces the entrant to acquire a costly license
or do research on an alternative technology which has a relative disadvantage, but can reduce
the amount of wasteful duplication. To answer the question: Does a broader scope give a
higher probability of innovation?, it remains to determine which e⁄ect dominates and under
what conditions. I solve for the innovation probabilities for a narrow and broad patent scope
respectively, for all values of ￿C 2 [0:5;1] and ￿ 2 [0;1] and the result is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Innovation probabilities. Area 1: Patent scope is inconsequential. Area 2: iN < iB. Area 3:
iN > iB. Area 4: the entrant chooses licensing and iN > iB:
16In the ￿gure, Panel a shows the innovation probabilities when the incumbent has all bar-
gaining power, and consequently no licensing takes place. This case gives the lower bound of
the e⁄ects of licensing. Panel b shows the innovation probabilities when the entrant has all
bargaining power and may choose licensing depending the expected payo⁄s from choosing A
relative to C. This case gives the upper bound of the e⁄ect of licensing. In both panels, the
area labeled 1 is the area in which the entrant chooses equilibrium A even under a narrow scope
and patent scope has no e⁄ect on the innovation probabilities. Both areas 2 and 3 are areas in
which the entrant chooses technology A under a broad scope and technology C under a narrow
scope. Hence, patent scope a⁄ects the entrant￿ s technology choice and a broad scope can reduce
wasteful duplication of R&D. However, in area 2, a broad patent scope gives more innovation
than a narrow scope, while in area 3; a narrow patent scope gives more innovation. As seen
in the ￿gure, a broad scope gives more innovation for low values of ￿C and ￿, that is if tech-
nology C has a small advantage relative to the alternative and the incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase
from innovation is high. If technology C has a small advantage, the entrant will not reduce his
investment to any considerable extent if he is induced to conduct R&D on technology A. If the
incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase from innovation is high, his investment is large and the amount of
wasteful duplication under a narrow scope is high. Consequently, a broad patent scope gives
more innovation. However, it is clear from comparing areas 2 and 3 that a narrow scope gives
more innovation for a lion￿ s share of the parameter space.
In panel b of Figure 1, the area labelled 4 is where ￿ < ￿L ; the entrant chooses to do R&D on
technology C and acquire a license if the patent scope is broad. Hence, the entrant invests in tech-
nology C even under a broad patent scope. In this case there is wasteful duplication of R&D under
both narrow and broad scope. However, under a narrow scope, no license is required and the in-
novation probability is given by iN = ￿C
￿
pC
I (￿;￿C) + pC





a broad scope, it is given by iB = ￿C (pI;L (￿;￿C) + pE;L (￿;￿C) ￿ pI;L (￿;￿C)pE;L (￿;￿C)). The
di⁄erence in innovation probabilities lies in the investment levels: both incumbent and entrant
invest less under a broad scope, as shown by (10) and (11). Therefore, if the entrant chooses to
acquire a license, a narrow scope always gives more innovation than a broad scope; iN > iB.
As described above, panel Panel b shows the case where the entrant has all bargaining power.
As the entrant￿ s bargaining power decreases, the license fee increases, which shifts area 4 to the
right until it disappears and we reach the lower bound on the e⁄ects of licensing, as depicted in
17Panel a. Comparing Panels a and b, it can be concluded that the area of the parameter space
in which a broad scope gives more innovation is decreasing in the entrant￿ s bargaining power. If
the entrant has higher bargaining power in license negotiations, he will be more likely to choose
technology C and obtain a license and in that case a broad patent scope does not reduce wasteful
duplication. Consequently, a broad patent scope is less conducive to innovation as the entrant￿ s
bargaining power increases.
4.4 Social surplus
The previous section shows under what conditions a broad and a narrow patent scope, respec-
tively, give the highest probability of innovation. However, maximizing innovation is desirable
only insofar as it is also socially optimal. In addition to the duplication e⁄ect, a social planner
must take two other e⁄ects of R&D into account. The ￿rst e⁄ect is the social value of an in-
vention, which is typically considered to be larger than the private value. The second e⁄ect is
the business stealing e⁄ect; as entrant ￿rms innovate, the incumbent￿ s pro￿t is lost. Therefore,
I analyze the e⁄ects of patent scope on social surplus, taking these e⁄ects into account.
I assume that the private value of an invention is proportional to the social value. In addition,
the social value of the new invention is S and of the current one is ￿S. I de￿ne the social surplus
under a narrow and broad scope as sN and sB, respectively;




















The numerical solution shows that for most of the parameter space, the patent scope which
generates the highest innovation probability is also the scope that is socially optimal. However,
when ￿ is close to 1, a broad scope, which implies less innovation, gives the highest surplus.
This holds irrespective of the amount of licensing that occurs. The reason is that the invention
generates such a small increase in social value that it is optimal to restrict the investments in
R&D. The tentative conclusion is that the socially optimal patent scope is that which maximizes
innovation, except when the increase in social value from the invention is small.8 The result
8The numerical solution for S = 5V shows that restricting investments is optimal for ￿ > 0:9. This
cuto⁄ level depends on S=V and if it is su¢ ciently large, restricting investments will never be optimal.
18can be compared to Chang (1995), which shows that a broad scope is optimal if the invention
generates a very small increase in social value, which also holds true in this model. However,
Chang (1995) also shows a broad scope is optimal if it generates a very large increase in social
value, which corresponds to the case when the incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase is high. As argued in
this paper, that result can hold with quali￿cations: namely, that there are viable alternatives to
the state-of-the-art technology available to entrant ￿rms.
4.5 Robustness checks
In the baseline model, I have set the value of the invention, V , to V = 1 to ensure that equilibrium
investments are interior solutions. Now, I allow for corner solutions where pI and pE equal 1,
and analyze the e⁄ects of an increase in V . I ￿nd that an increase in V increases the area of
parameter space for which a broad scope gives more innovation than a narrow scope. The reason
is that an increase in V increases the investment by both ￿rms, while under a narrow scope,
there is also an increase in the amount of duplication.9
As a robustness check, I also allow V to take a higher, exogenously given value under a broad
relative to a narrow patent scope. This captures, albeit crudely, the notion that in a broad patent
scope regime, ￿rms can expect future patent to be broad in scope. Let V B = ￿V N; ￿ = 1:5; ￿rms
expect that a broad patent scope increases the value of the invention by 50 percent. The result
is an increase in the area of parameter space for which a broad scope gives more innovation than
a narrow scope, as compared to Figure 1. However, it is still the case that a broad patent scope
gives more innovation for at most half the total area of parameter space spanned by ￿ and ￿C.
In this model, patent scope is modeled as binary; either it is narrow or broad. This modeling
choice has clear advantages; it captures the e⁄ect of patent scope on technology choice and
duplication in a transparent way, and allows for analytical solutions. However, as an additional
robustness check, I also construct a version of the model where patent scope is a continuous
variable. Now, it is necessary to resort fully to numerical solutions. I solve the model for the
patent scope that maximizes the probability of innovation in case of no licensing, and ￿nd that
Additional details are available upon request.
9An increase in V also increases the area of parameter space for which patent scope is inconsequential;
it increases the incumbent￿ s investment, which decreases the entrant￿ s payo⁄ in equilibrium of type C but
not A.
19the main results remain; the optimal patent scope is broadest when ￿ is low, and ￿C is low.10
5 Extension of the model: Stackelberg competition
Until now, it has been assumed that the two ￿rms simultaneously decide how much to invest.
Suppose instead, as is common in many industries, that the incumbent can commit to an invest-
ment in R&D. For example, he builds a new research lab or employs researchers. The entrant
observes the incumbent￿ s investment and then decides which technology to invest in and how
much to invest. In order to keep the model tractable, I abstract from licensing. Hence, it is
assumed that under a broad patent scope, the entrant always invests in technology A.
Introducing Stackelberg competition in this framework a⁄ects the interaction between the
two ￿rms as follows. As shown in the main model, in equilibrium C, the two ￿rms￿investments
depend upon each other, whereas in equilibrium A, they are independent. Hence, in equilibrium
C; the incumbent can a⁄ect the entrant￿ s investment level. In addition, the incumbent can a⁄ect
the entrant￿ s technology choice. If the incumbent￿ s investment is su¢ ciently large, the entrant
gets a higher expected payo⁄ from avoiding competition from the incumbent and consequently
he chooses technology A over technology C: By strategic overinvestment, the incumbent can keep
the entrant out of its patented technology. This occurs even if the patent scope is narrow, so that
there is no risk of patent infringement. Therefore, introducing Stackelberg competition can have
important implications in this model, as will be seen below. I start by describing the equilibrium
investment levels under a narrow patent scope.
5.1 Narrow patent scope
Under a narrow patent scope, the entrant can choose technology C without any risk of infringe-
ment. Let the investment by the incumbent and the entrant in equilibrium C be pI;S and pE;S,
respectively, where subscript S denotes Stackelberg competition. Now, the incumbent chooses
pI;S ￿rst. The entrant observes pI;S, and then chooses pE;S. Hence, the incumbent￿ s chosen
investment level directly a⁄ects the entrant￿ s investment, and the incumbent takes this into ac-
count. To ￿nd the optimal investment by the incumbent, I insert (3) into (1). Setting V = 1
10Additional details are available upon request.
20and taking the ￿rst-order condition yields
pI;S(￿;￿C) =



















Comparing the incumbent￿ s investment under Stackelberg competition to that of the main model,
it is possible to show the following.




, pI;S(￿;￿C) > pC
I (￿;￿C):
Proof. See the Appendix.
If the incumbent is a Stackelberg leader, he optimally invests more than if the two ￿rms move
simultaneously.
The incumbent￿ s ability to in￿ uence the entrant￿ s technology choice can be described as
follows. The level of investment by the incumbent which induces the entrant to choose technology





The incumbent has to invest less than ￿ pI(￿C) for equilibrium C to arise. Likewise, the incumbent
must invest at least ￿ pI(￿C) for equilibrium A to arise. ￿ pI(￿C) is increasing in ￿C; the higher is
the relative advantage of technology C, the larger is the investment required to keep the entrant
out of it. Note that if ￿C > 2
3, not even the maximal investment by the incumbent, ￿ pI(￿C) = 1,
can prevent the entrant from choosing technology C.
In order to establish which equilibria will arise under Stackelberg competition, I de￿ne a
threshold ￿S 2 (0;1), where S denotes Stackelberg competition, such that the incumbent￿ s
payo⁄s in the two types of equilibria are equal:
￿I(A; ￿ pI(￿C);pA
E(￿C)) = ￿I(C;pI;S(￿S;￿C);pE;S(￿S;￿C)):
11I assume that if indi⁄erent, the entrant chooses A.
21Given the threshold ￿S, it is possible to show the following:
Proposition 4 If ￿ > ￿S, the Nash equilibrium is C.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If ￿ ￿ ￿S, the incumbent will choose the investment level ￿ pI(￿C) and thereby, he induces the
entrant to choose to conduct R&D on technology A. I denote this strategic overinvestment by
the incumbent. As ￿ increases, the incumbent￿ s incentives for innovation decrease and he prefers
to invest less. However, it is only in equilibrium C that he can reduce his investment, as he must
invest at least ￿ pI(￿C) in equilibrium A. For ￿ above the threshold ￿S, the incumbent obtains a
higher expected payo⁄ in equilibrium C and chooses not to strategically overinvest. Hence, the
equilibrium is C.
Given the optimal investment by both ￿rms, we can characterize the resulting innovation
probability. Let iN;S be the innovation probability under a narrow scope, where superscript S





￿C￿ pI(￿C) + (1 ￿ ￿C)pA
E (￿C)
￿C (pI;S(￿S;￿C) + pE;S(￿;￿C) ￿ pI;S(￿;￿C)pE;S(￿;￿C))
if ￿ ￿ ￿S
if ￿ > ￿S
(15)
Now, if ￿ ￿ ￿S; the equilibrium is A, and there is no wasteful duplication of R&D. If, instead,
￿ > ￿S, the equilibrium is C and there is wasteful duplication of R&D.
5.2 Broad patent scope
If the patent scope is broad, the entrant chooses technology A, since there is no possibility
for licensing. In equilibrium A, two ￿rms￿investments are independent and the incumbent￿ s
commitment to an R&D investment has no e⁄ect. Just as in the case of simultaneous moves,
the entrant optimally invests pA
E(￿C) under Stackelberg competition. Hence, the probability of
innovation is
iB;S = ￿CpA
I (￿;￿C) + (1 ￿ ￿C)pA
E (￿C) (16)
where superscript S denotes Stackelberg competition. If we compare this expression to the
innovation probability under a narrow scope, as given by (15), it is clear that if ￿ ￿ ￿S such that
the entrant chooses A under a narrow scope, the only di⁄erence between the patent regimes is
22that under a narrow scope, the incumbent strategically overinvests whereas under a broad scope
there is no need to do so; ￿ pI(￿C) > pA
I (￿;￿C).12 Hence, total R&D investment is higher and it
follows that iN;S > iB;S. If instead, ￿ > ￿S; the trade-o⁄s between a broad and a narrow scope
are as in the main model; a narrow scope gives wasteful duplication whereas a under a broad
scope the entrant invests in a less promising technology. Again, the net e⁄ect will depend on
parameter values.
5.3 E⁄ects of patent scope on the probability of innovation
Which patent scope gives the highest innovation probability depends on the parameters ￿ and ￿C
in the model with Stackelberg competition as well as in the main model. I solve for the innovation
probabilities for a narrow and broad patent scope respectively, for all values of ￿C 2 [0:5;1] and
￿ 2 [0;1] and the result is shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Innovation probabilities, Stackelberg competition. Area 1: Patent
scope is inconsequential. Area 2: iN;S < iB;S. Area 3: iN;S > iB;S.
In the ￿gure, the area labeled 1 is the area in which the entrant chooses equilibrium A even
under a narrow scope and patent scope has no e⁄ect on the innovation probabilities. Area 2 is
where a broad scope gives more innovation than a narrow scope and 3 is where a narrow scope
12If ￿ pI(￿C) ￿ pA
I (￿;￿C), patent scope has no e⁄ect on innovation probabilities.
23gives more innovation. The ￿gure shows that a broad scope gives more innovation for only a
small subset of parameter space; area 2. This holds for values of ￿ close to zero and values of
￿C close to 0.7. Why does a broad patent scope give more innovation in this area of parameter
space? The vertical line gives the threshold ￿C = 2
3, above which the incumbent can no longer
induce the entrant to choose A. In area 2, ￿C > 2
3 which implies that under a narrow patent
scope, the entrant chooses technology C. In this case, the negative e⁄ects of wasteful duplication
under a narrow scope are su¢ ciently large that a broad scope gives more innovation.
To the left of area 2, the equilibrium under a narrow scope is A, as the incumbent chooses
to overinvest su¢ ciently to keep the entrant out of technology C. As described above, there is
no wasteful duplication under a narrow patent scope and the only di⁄erence between the patent
regimes is that under a narrow scope, the incumbent strategically overinvests which implies that
total R&D investment is higher. Hence, a narrow scope gives more innovation.
To the right of area 2, the entrant chooses C under a narrow scope. Here, a higher value of
￿C increases total investments under a narrow scope su¢ ciently to give more innovation than
under a broad scope.
With Stackelberg competition, we see that the incumbent￿ s ability to commit a⁄ects both
optimal investment levels and the amount of wasteful duplication that occurs. If the incumbent
induces the entrant to choose technology A, there is no wasteful duplication under a narrow
scope, which in turn removes the imperative for a broad patent scope. If we compare Figures 1
and 2, it is clear that if commitment is possible, the potential bene￿t of a broad patent scope is
almost eradicated.
6 Concluding comments
The model developed in this paper is motivated by the perceived increase in patent protection
in the US and Europe, manifested by an increase in patent scope. The main ￿nding is that
under some conditions, the negative e⁄ects of R&D duplication are su¢ ciently large to warrant
a broad patent scope: If the incumbent￿ s pro￿t increase from innovation is large, and if the
patented technology has a small advantage relative to the alternative technology, a broad patent
scope gives more innovation than a narrow scope. The former implies a high degree of wasteful
duplication if ￿rms choose the same technology and the latter that the entrant￿ s investment in the
alternative technology is high if he is induced to choose it. However, the higher is the entrant￿ s
24bargaining power in license negotiations, the less conducive is a broad scope to innovation. As the
license fee decreases, the entrant more often chooses licensing, which implies wasteful duplication
of R&D. I also ￿nd that if the model is extended to Stackelberg competition the advantage of
a broad scope to a large extent disappears, as strategic overinvestment by the incumbent can
eliminate wasteful duplication under a narrow patent scope.
This paper shows that the e⁄ects of an increase in patent scope depend on technology and
market characteristics, such as the availability of alternative technologies, the incumbent￿ s gains
from innovation and ability to commit to R&D investment, as well as the ￿rms￿bargaining powers
in license agreements. An increase in patent scope may increase innovation in a given market.
However, it requires that conditions on the form of competition, the technological alternatives
and license agreements etc., are met. According to this model, a uniform increase in patent scope
across industries, such as awarding patent holders larger powers in infringement lawsuits which
is argued has taken place in the US and Europe, cannot be optimal. It has substantial policy
implications: in 2008, the US courts alone handled 2 605 patent infringement cases.13
This result raises a new question: is the optimal policy implementable? To set the optimal
scope ex ante, the Patent O¢ ce must make predictions of, for example, the technology￿ s ad-
vantage relative to alternatives and the patent holder￿ s incentive for further improvement of the
invention he seeks to patent. This might seem an inherently di¢ cult task for the patent exam-
iner. However, the patent scope is also determined ex post, if the patent holder sues another
party for infringement. At this point in time, the necessary characteristics are observed rather
than predicted. To implement the optimal policy, courts should ￿nd a product infringing only
if the patent holder has large incentives for innovation and there are viable alternatives to the
patented technology. If entrant ￿rms anticipate such a decision by the court, they can make the
socially desirable technology choice.
A direction for future research is to increase the realism of the model by extending it to a dy-
namic framework, where the e⁄ects of expectations and the dynamics of technology development
can be analyzed.
13The National Law Journal, January 19, 2009.
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Proof of Proposition 1
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Proof of Proposition 2
Let V = 1. I assume that if indi⁄erent, the entrant chooses A. The entrant chooses C if
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: It can be simpli￿ed to
0 > ￿C
￿
6￿￿C ￿ 2￿C ￿ 4￿ + ￿2
C ￿ 3￿￿2
C ￿ 4￿2￿C + 2￿2￿2
C
￿




C:The problem is max
￿C;￿ J(￿;￿C) s.t. 0 6 ￿ 6 1 and 1
2 6 ￿C 6 1 which
yields a global maximum at J(0;0:5) = ￿0:75. Hence, pI;S(￿;￿C) > pC
I (￿;￿C).
Proof of Proposition 4
Let pC




C(5￿C￿2) . If ￿ > ^ ￿1, pC
I;S(￿;￿C) =
pI;S(￿;￿C).If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿1, pC
I;S(￿;￿C) = ￿ pI(￿C). Let pA
I;S(￿;￿C) = max(pA
I (￿;￿C); ￿ pI(￿C)): I de-





. If ￿ > ^ ￿2, pA
I;S(￿;￿C) = ￿ pI(￿C): If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿2, pA
I;S(￿;￿C) = pA
I (￿;￿C).
Case 1: ￿ ￿ ^ ￿1 and ￿ ￿ ^ ￿2 . Case 2: ￿ > ^ ￿1 and ￿ ￿ ^ ￿2. Case 3: ￿ ￿ ^ ￿1 and
￿ > ^ ￿2. Case 4: ￿ > ^ ￿1 and ￿ > ^ ￿2. I assume that if indi⁄erent, the incumbent chooses A.









































) > ￿I(C; ￿ pI(￿C);pE) can be simpli-
￿ed to ￿2
C (2￿C ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿C)(1 ￿ ￿) > 0: For ￿C ￿ 1
2 and ￿ ￿ 1 :
￿2
C (2￿C ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿C)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0: The equilibrium is A. Case 1: Compare ￿I(C; ￿ pI(￿C);pE),


































￿ ￿I(C; ￿ pI(￿C);pE). The equilibrium is A.













































C+2) The denominator is pos-
itive. Let the numerator be denoted K(￿;￿C):The problem is max￿C;￿ K(￿;￿C) s.t. ￿ 2







) > ￿I (C;pI;S(￿;￿C);pE;S(￿;￿C)): The equilibrium is A. Case





























































), ￿ ￿ ￿S :





): Show that ^ ￿1 < ￿S for ￿C 2 [0:5332;0:6667].































. This can be simpli￿ed to:
0 < 8￿4































































which holds for ￿C 2
[0:5332;0:6667]. Hence, for ￿ > ￿S, the equilibrium is C.
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